

Message Text

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ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 OES-07 SS-15 SSO-00 INRE-00 ACDA-12
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TO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 057425

USIAEA, BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEEC

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PARM, TECH, IAEA, EC, ENRG

SUBJECT:SOVIET PAPER ON EURATOM-IAEA SAFEGUARDS

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1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PAPER HANDED TO MARSHALL SHULMAN
BY SOVIET EMBASSY COUNSELOR BESSMERTNYKH ON MARCH 3. PARA
2, BELOW, IS COVERING PAPER PRESENTED IN ENGLISH, AND PARA
3 IS DEPARTMENT TRANSLATION FROM RUSSIAN ORIGINAL OF
ATTACHED PAPER, WHICH HAPPENED TO BE ADDRESSED TO FRG BUT
WAS DESCRIBED AS SIMILAR TO PAPERS GIVEN TO OTHER EURATOM
MEMBERS.

2. BEGIN TEXT: WE WOULD LIKE TO INFORM THE US GOVERNMENT AS A SUPPLIER OF NUCLEAR FUEL AND MATERIALS TO THE COUNTRIES OF EURATOM ABOUT THIS MESSAGE TO THE NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES OF EURATOM. WE WOULD LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE ESPECIALLY ACTIVE OPPOSITION BY THE FRG TO THE CONTROL BY THE IAEA OF ITS NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES.

WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT STEPS THE US GOVERNMENT HAS IN MIND TO TAKE TO HELP THE IAEA IN SOLVING THAT PROBLEM.

3. IN SEPTEMBER 1977 THE SOVIET SIDE CALLED THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

GERMANY TO THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF THE FACT THAT THE NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES OF EURATOM ARE DELAYING PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTROL AGREEMENT WITH IAEA.

YET ANOTHER DEADLINE, AGREED UPON WITH IAEA, FOR WORKING OUT PROCEDURES AND METHODS OF CONTROL BY THE AGENCY IN THE NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES OF EURATOM HAS PASSED, AND THE AGENCY CONTINUES TO BE UNABLE TO EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENT SUCH CONTROL IN PRACTICE. THIS IS EXPLAINED BY THE POSITION OF THE COUNTRIES OF EURATOM, WHICH ARE OPPOSING IAEA'S RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT INSPECTION CONTROL OF NUCLEAR
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INSTALLATIONS IN THOSE COUNTRIES AND CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE AGENCY LIMIT ITSELF TO MERELY CHECKING THE RESULTS OF THE WORK OF THE EURATOM CONTROL APPARATUS.

WE COULD NOT FAIL TO NOTE THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE FRG ON THIS QUESTION. UNFORTUNATELY, THE FRG HAS NOT PROVIDED THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE IN WORKING OUT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN IAEA AND EURATOM REGARDING CONTROL MEASURES. IT WOULD BE CLOSER TO THE TRUTH TO SAY THAT JUST THE OPPOSITE HAS BEEN THE CASE. SUCH A SITUATION GIVES RISE TO UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN, ALL THE MORE SO IN LIGHT OF THE CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS WHICH ARE BEING UNDERTAKEN IN THE FRG IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR ENERGY UTILIZATION.

WE ARE NOT SPEAKING OF DIFFERENCES REGARDING THE TECHNICAL DETAILS OF ORGANIZING THE CONTROL, BUT ABOUT A SERIOUS POLITICAL QUESTION, WHICH AFFECTS THE ASPECTS OF TRUST AND SECURITY IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES. THE COUNTRIES OF EURATOM ARE SETTING A BAD EXAMPLE FOR OTHER NON-NUCLEAR STATES-PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH HAVE NOT YET PUT INTO EFFECT CONTROL AGREEMENTS WITH IAEA. IN THE FINAL

ANALYSIS, IT IS THEY THEMSELVES WHO WILL BE THE LOSERS AS A RESULT OF THEIR POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF CONTROL, BECAUSE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY CANNOT PROCEED WITHOUT EFFECTIVE CONTROL BY IAEA.

SUCH CONTROL MUST COMPLETELY CONFORM TO THE TECHNICAL CRITERIA FOR SAFEGUARDS, WORKED OUT JOINTLY AND ADOPTED BY IAEA, AND CANNOT BE SUPPLANTED BY THE EURATOM INTERNAL SYSTEM OF SAFEGUARDS, REGARDLESS OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS. MOREOVER, THE EURATOM SYSTEM OF SAFEGUARDS HAS BEEN FAR FROM PERFECT.

AT PRESENT, AS A RESULT OF THE WORK ACCOMPLISHED IN
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VIENNA, THE PROSPECTS FOR RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF CONTROL HAVE BEEN OUTLINED. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NO NEW OBSTACLES SHOULD ARISE AT THE CONCLUDING STAGE, AND THAT ALL INTERESTED STATES SHOULD ACT IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT, GUIDED BY THE INTERESTS OF REACHING AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

THE SOVIET SIDE EXPECTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRG WILL TREAT THIS COMMUNICATION WITH ALL SERIOUSNESS AND WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO ENABLE IAEA TO BEGIN FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS FUNCTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONTROL AGREEMENT BETWEEN IAEA AND EURATOM.
END TEXT. VANCE

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